--- product_id: 13304008 title: "A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination" brand: "gerald m. edelman" price: "141.53 DT" currency: TND in_stock: true reviews_count: 7 url: https://www.desertcart.tn/products/13304008-a-universe-of-consciousness-how-matter-becomes-imagination store_origin: TN region: Tunisia --- # A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination **Brand:** gerald m. edelman **Price:** 141.53 DT **Availability:** ✅ In Stock ## Quick Answers - **What is this?** A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination by gerald m. edelman - **How much does it cost?** 141.53 DT with free shipping - **Is it available?** Yes, in stock and ready to ship - **Where can I buy it?** [www.desertcart.tn](https://www.desertcart.tn/products/13304008-a-universe-of-consciousness-how-matter-becomes-imagination) ## Best For - gerald m. edelman enthusiasts ## Why This Product - Trusted gerald m. edelman brand quality - Free international shipping included - Worldwide delivery with tracking - 15-day hassle-free returns ## Description Full description not available ## Images ![A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination - Image 1](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/71fJ6YM8UrL.jpg) ## Customer Reviews ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Neurobiology of consciousness *by R***O on Reviewed in the United States on October 7, 2009* This is an excellent review of consciousness from the neurobiological point of view. Consciousness has been an interesting topic for study not only for neurobiologists but also for philosophers and physicists. Although consciousness is a highly debated topic because of its close interaction with matter in space and time, it is certainly least understood subject as it is at the borderline of physics, philosophy and neurobiology. Some quantum physicists argue that it is a universal field like space, time or energy, but consciousness does not figure in equations or any mathematical calculations. Secondly consciousness is found only in living beings and not in inanimate objects: Particularly animals that have brain and central nervous system. The book is summarized as follows:Three working assumptions are made as methodological platform; 1) the physics assumption; conventional physical processes are required to explain consciousness or the conscious experience, 2) the evolutionary assumption; consciousness is evolved by natural selection in the animal systems, and 3) qualia assumption; the subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness, being private, cannot be communicated directly through a scientific theory. The authors do not attempt to explain many forms of perception, imagery, thought, emo¬tion, mood, attention, will, or self-consciousness. Instead, they concentrate on certain fundamental properties of consciousness that are shared by every conscious states, such as the unity of a conscious state experienced as a whole and cannot be subdivided into independent components, and the infor¬mativeness, i.e., where a conscious state is selected from a repertoire of billions of possible conscious states, each with different behavioral consequences within a fraction of a second. The basic assumption in all this is that consciousness is a process that is private, selective, and continually changing. It is strictly a process, and not belonging to a particular section of brain. This means that consciousness is associated with biological structures that produce dynamic processes. Thus both morphology and consciousness are the products of evolutionary selection (natural selection). This assumption about the evolutionary origin of consciousness avoids fruitless efforts to relate consciousness to computer logic or the effect of quantum gravity on neurons or a pure quantum physical process while diminishing the role of brain.Neural substrates of consciousness involve large populations of neurons and no single area of brain is responsible for conscious experience. As the task to be learned is practiced and its performance becomes more and more mechanical then the learning task fades from the memory and the regions for this task becomes smaller. Conscious experience is associated with changes of activity patterns occurring simultaneously in many regions of brain (i.e., activation and inactivation of a population of neurons). It is not how many neurons are active but it is the distribution of groups of neurons that can engage in strong and rapid re-entrant interactions. Further more, the activity patterns of rapidly interacting groups must be constantly changing and sufficiently differentiated from each other: This is called Dynamic Core Hypothesis. Consciousness is an extraordinarily differentiated. At any given time, we experience a particular conscious state selected out of billions of possible states, each of which can lead to different behavioral consequences. The occurrence of a particular conscious state is therefore highly informative in the specific sense that information is the reduction of uncertainty among a number of alternatives. If this is the case the neural processes underlying the conscious experience must also be highly differentiated and informative.Memory is a central brain mechanism that leads to consciousness. Memory does not store inscription or information in any format. In higher organisms it is an act of creation for every act of perception, and every act of memory is an act of imagination. The primary consciousness has the ability to construct an integrated mental scene in the present that does not require language or true sense of self. The integrated neural scene depends on both perceptual categorization of incoming sensor stimuli (the present) and its interaction with categorical memories (the past). The neural mechanisms distinguish primary consciousness and higher order consciousness. Primary consciousness is found in human as well as some higher order animals, but these lack language, analytical skill, and limited symbolic (semantic) capabilities. Still they are capable of constructing a mental scene. The higher-order consciousness found in humans has semantic capability and linguistic capability in most advanced form which provides a sense of self and the ability to construct past and future. The author' main contention is that the consciousness arose from evolutionary innovations in the morphology of the brain and body. The mind arises from the body and its development. Much of the discussion by the authors are theoretical in nature and needs extensive experimental evidences to support this theory.1.  Brain And Being: At The Boundary Between Science, Philosophy, Language, And Arts (Advances in Consciousness Research) 2.  Wholeness and the Implicate Order (Routledge Classics) 3.  The Holographic Universe 4.  Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and Principles in Neuropsychology ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Fascinating information *by K***M on Reviewed in the United States on May 21, 2022* This brilliant scientist presents much brain information in a clear, concise, accessible way for the non-scientist reader. Highly recommend for the discerning reader. Casts light on just what is meant by consciousness...and how far scientists have gotten with solving this puzzle. ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐ A Plausible Account of Brains and Minds *by S***Y on Reviewed in the United States on April 17, 2009* Densely written and packed with technical terms, the book is not an easy read. It also does not excel in making difficult ideas clear and easy to grasp. That said, the book offers an interesting take on how brains work to produce consciousness while reserving the more philosophic issues (which happen to hold more interest for me) to the end. The philosophic questions hinge on how we should think about consciousness (the most accurate way of conceiving of it) and the implications of this for actual scientific research.The bulk of the book is taken up with laying out a theory of how the various parts of the brain work together to produce the features we recognize as consciousness and this may well be the most difficult part for those not familiar with the terminology or some of the underlying science. Only at the end do the authors make explicit the conceptual underpinnings of their research program and basic thesis about how the brain makes the mind.For those unfamiliar with the philosophical disputes, there have been ongoing debates over whether mind is ontologically prior to matter or is co-equal with it or is merely a function of matter. Edelman and Tononi come down firmly on the side of matter being primary and in so doing take their stand firmly in the modern scientific realist camp (though they explain their position later in the book as being one of "qualified realism" because they do not accept that we have direct access to the world as it is). In this they share a view of consciousness with other scientifically minded philosophers including Daniel Dennett ( Consciousness Explained ) and John Searle of "Chinese Room Argument" fame ( Minds, Brains and Science (1984 Reith Lectures) ; Mind, Language, and Society : Philosophy in the Real World ; The  The Mystery of Consciousness , etc.)Edelmen and Tononi go further to conclude that minds must be "embodied" (not only in brains but in the physical linkages that tie brains to the world around them, which is to say they require full bodies or equivalents a la a philosopher like Jerry Fodor); more, like both Dennett and Searle they recognize that brains are the sole seat of consciousness (contra some in the philosophical camp like the so-called panpsychists who theorize that consciousness may be ubiquitous in the universe having a presence at all levels and in all corners of the physical world).Like Dennett, too, but not apparently like Searle (though Searle is very often unclear on this), the authors here see consciousness as an amalgam or array of very distinct processes grading up the scale, from lower levels to higher, and recognize what they call a primary consciousness (one set of processes/functionalities found in lower level animals) and higher order consciousness (recognizable in us and riding on the primary consciousness). They spend a good deal of this book theorizing on which parts of the brain support which functions and by showing how some functions are composites of others (explaining why they say consciousness is not seated in any particular part of the brain but across the broad area of the brain in its entirety).However unlike Dennett, but like Searle, they hold that computers are NOT good candidates for replicating what brains do vis a vis producing consciousness. This is an important distinction because it puts them at odds with computationalists who see in Artificial Intelligence research the key to understanding how brains work. In a nutshell, the authors' argument appears to hinge on a distinction they draw between the organizing principle they term "selection" and logic. It goes something like this:1) Everything at bottom is physical (in the broad, not the 19th century, sense) and, though we may not know (and may never know) all the laws of physics, whatever those laws are control and drive all things that happen in the universe.2) Within the physical universe various self-contained, self-sustaining and self-propagating systems take form (i.e., life) and these systems persist through a process of selection (as in "natural selection") which is to say that, by trial and error, what works survives and what doesn't fades.3) The key factor in selection is the capacity to retain, that is, memory. By "memory" they don't mean our kind, of course, but just a retention capability that takes many forms and is fairly mechanical at its most basic level (as in the way antibodies in the blood "learn" and retain the capacity to affix themselves to invading entities and thereby neutralize them).4) As systems evolve through the selection process, their capacities and their parts (including brains in higher form systems like us) become increasingly more capable of responding to the surrounding environment thanks to the ongoing selection in which they are constantly engaged.5) At a certain point some of these systems develop things like brains and some of the brains develop primary consciousness and some with primary consciousness become increasingly more sophisticated, developing the capacity for self-awareness, intentionality, reasoning, etc., i.e., higher consciousness. All these developments are refinements of the core memory capacity which makes selection work as a driving principle throughout the range of all self-sustaining, self-propagating systems. Thus consciousness is just increasingly refined memory (because the entity with this capacity, or capacities, can do more with what is retained and can retain more, to boot).6) Higher level consciousness in brains yields an array of new features and capacities including language, mathematics, art, logic and, as the authors add, things like the madness of crowds (think Charles MacKay here  Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds ). These added capacities operate in a kind of feedback mode with the consciousnesses that create and use them to further amplify the capacities of the relevant consciousnesses.7) Since computers are just instantiated logic, logic in action, they are functions of higher order consciousness (because logic comes from consciousness and does not pre-exist, or co-exist with, it).8) Insofar as computers are logic-driven rather than selection-driven, they are totally different from brains.9) Therefore it makes no sense to suppose they can do what brains can do vis a vis things like producing consciousness.Why not? Because brains, say the authors, don't contain programmed instructions and therefore don't operate computationally. They do run processes which look superficially similar to what computers do (both include electrical firings in various patterns, produced by the physical platform), but their underlying mechanism, their underlying modus operandi, is selectional not logical. The reason this is important is that selection is indeterminate while logic is determinate.Selection happens when some physical system, or aspect of such a system, picks up and retains a change that improves its performance in its environment. There is no pre-determined plan or instruction at work in selection while logic is about order according to set rules and computation is logic driven.Yet, their conclusion concerning the noncandidacy of computers as synthetic brains based on this is open to some serious doubt:1) Whatever it is, logic seems to be as firmly grounded in the physical facts of the world as selection and, indeed, one can describe what happens at the rawest physical level as informational transfer, with a logic component, too. (That is, the distinction between selection and logic they are trying to draw may be more arbitrary than real.) Another way of seeing this: A logical rule like Identity, "A=A", is not just a prescriptive (when THIS is the case, then THIS is the case). It is also expressive of a fundamental physical fact in the universe, i.e., that it is inconceivable that a thing is ever other than itself. Thus one could say "A=A" just expresses the fact "A". As an expression of the physical universe it is no different than selection, itself an aspect of the physical universe.But let's assume that there is a real distinction to be made here:2) It hinges, the authors tell us, on the notion that selection is indeterminate whereas logic is determinate. Now this partly reflects the conflation of logic as a system of explanation (the study of the rules for accomplishing certain verbal or other kinds of tasks) with logic as a system of instructions in a computer program. Certainly a program IS logically based but what makes it determinate is not that fact but that it is designed to be, i.e., the logic is used to achieve a determined purpose. But massively parallel computation (as proposed by Dennett in his model for replicating consciousness) introduces indeterminacy by adding the possibility of real time interaction between parallel processors. The more processors, the more real time interactions. So if brains are structured on an indeterminacy model a la the organizing principle of selection, it is conceivable that sufficient indeterminacy is achievable on computers, too.3) Which leads to the most important point. If, as Edelman and Tononi maintain, consciousness (the array of disparate features we recognize as that) is (as Dennett would have it) a process-based system at bottom, then the issue does not hinge on the platform, necessarily, but on the processes, i.e., on whether they can perform the requisite functions in the requisite way. That is, there is nothing in this view of consciousness that necessarily even requires a particular method of generating the needed processes at all. What matters is whether the features we recognize as constituting what we mean by "consciousness" can be replicated in the system in question, not what the system is made of.On balance this is a good and useful book but its philosophical conclusion, at least with regard to the viability of the computational model is at least suspect. On the other hand the science looks to be pretty good vis a vis the way brains might actually work.SWM --- ## Why Shop on Desertcart? - 🛒 **Trusted by 1.3+ Million Shoppers** — Serving international shoppers since 2016 - 🌍 **Shop Globally** — Access 737+ million products across 21 categories - 💰 **No Hidden Fees** — All customs, duties, and taxes included in the price - 🔄 **15-Day Free Returns** — Hassle-free returns (30 days for PRO members) - 🔒 **Secure Payments** — Trusted payment options with buyer protection - ⭐ **TrustPilot Rated 4.5/5** — Based on 8,000+ happy customer reviews **Shop now:** [https://www.desertcart.tn/products/13304008-a-universe-of-consciousness-how-matter-becomes-imagination](https://www.desertcart.tn/products/13304008-a-universe-of-consciousness-how-matter-becomes-imagination) --- *Product available on Desertcart Tunisia* *Store origin: TN* *Last updated: 2026-06-07*