Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941-1945

Once the Soviet Union fell in 1991 and the era of Glasnost arrived it was inevitable that western historians would seek to re-appraise the eastern front in the Second World War. One of the early efforts was Russia's War, written by British historian Richard Overy. He used some of the early released information to re-examine our knowledge of the Russo-German War and to attempt to explain just how the Soviet Union was able to defeat what appeared to be the strongest military power on earth. Readers should be aware that this book is not a blow-by-blow campaign history but rather, a book that uses thematic-based chapters to chart the course of Soviet victory. Furthermore, this book has already been dated by further research into Soviet wartime records by historians such as the prodigious David M. Glantz; for example, there is no mention of the disastrous 1942 Operation `Mars.' Overall, this book is a useful supplement to Glantz's own one-volume summary of the war, When Titans Clash, since it touches on elements affecting Soviet power that Glantz (who is strictly focused on military issues) omits. Russia's War is divided into ten chapters, consisting of 330 pages of text and 36 pages of endnotes. The author also provides 11 sketch maps and 3 tables, as well as 32 very dark and blurry B/W photos. The author states his hypothesis up front when he says that, "material explanations of Soviet victory are never quite convincing" and opines that one cannot account for Soviet victory without addressing the idea of a Russian soul or spirit. Instead, he seeks to demolish the stereotype that Soviet victory was simply the product of overwhelming numerical superiority. The first chapter deals with the creation of the Stalinist state in the USSR during the interwar period and Stalin's pre-occupation with building up the Soviet Union against both internal and external attack. Overy notes that Stalin's forced collectivization - always condemned outright in the West - made a huge demographic shift from rural areas to the cities, which made possible the industrial programs of the 1930s. In short order, Stalin transformed Russia from a primarily agrarian economy to a nation of heavy industries, which provided the basis for industrial mobilization in 1941-45. The author concludes that, "without the economic transformation, the Red Army would have been a feeble force in 1941, relying on a vast base of peasant manpower." Although Overy also discusses the impact of Stalinist purges on the Soviet military, he believes that they have been exaggerated and that, the Red Army `had severe weaknesses both before and after the purges," such as very weak command and control due to lack of radios and the interference of political commissars.The next several chapters are rather disappointing. Chapter two deals with the lead-up to war in 1937-41 but skims over Soviet military modernization efforts as well as Khalkin-Gol and the Russo-Finnish War. Chapters three and four deal with Operation Barbarossa and Soviet efforts to defend Leningrad and Moscow but really don't offer any new material. Overy does conclude that, "it was not the tough winter conditions that halted the German army but the remarkable revival of Soviet military manpower after the terrible maulings of the summer and autumn," but contends that these actions were not decisive. In the fifth chapter, on terror and resistance, Overy crosses over an old `taboo' line by mentioning the active cooperation of thousands of Cossacks with the invading Germans and states that, "an estimated one million Soviet soldiers ended up fighting against their country." These comments are important but exaggerated, since Vlasov's army was not formed until 1945 and most other units formed from eastern volunteers were only battalion or regiment-sized. The author also assails the cherished icon of Soviet partisans, stating that their role was fairly limited and describes them as "the kamikazes of the Soviet war effort."On a number of issues, Overy seems unable to drag himself out of the morass of Soviet wartime propaganda. For example, he claims that virtually all of the German troops involved in the Korsun Pocket breakout in February 1944 were `massacred' - essentially parotting Soviet wartime claims - while fresh research reveals that 35,000 out of 45,000 Germans escaped the pocket. Similarly, Overy's treatment of Soviet inactivity during the uprising of the Polish Home Army is August 1944 is as insulting as it is faulty.In the sixth and seventh chapters, the author covers the critical battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, considered the decisive actions. He notes that the combination of Stalin's `not-a-step-backward' order and ferocious Soviet propaganda brought Soviet society "to a fever pitch of hatred and vengeance" in 1942, which contributed to the Red Army's victory at Stalingrad. In the Kursk chapter, he cites Stalin's willingness to gradually give more decision-making authority to his military professionals, which contrasted greatly with Hitler's move in the opposite direction and that this, "created a central team of military managers and thinkers which radically altered Soviet fighting power." With Soviet industry churning out large numbers of modern tanks, artillery and aircraft, a revitalized Soviet military elite was allowed to plan and conduct its campaigns based on military rather than political logic. Overy also cites other factors that contributed to Soviet victory: two thirds of women were drafted to work in factories while most German women stayed at home; Western Lend-Lease provided the Soviets with vital non-combat gear (radios, trucks, boots), allowing Soviet industry to concentrate on weapons production; and the role of slave-labor in the Soviet Gulgag, which produced 15 percent of all ammunition. Overall, Professor Overy concludes that Soviet victory was based on a combination of factors, but the foremost were the series of brutal policies enacted by Stalin that made the Soviet Union a far more militarized state than the old Tsarist Russia. While this book made an important contribution when it first appeared over a decade ago, it is becoming obsolete and should be used with care.

This is an excellent, wide ranging, laden packed short summary of history during Stalin's time in power but I couldn't give it five stars for it's not the equal of John Erickson's two volume set. Its also a synthesis from existing works and as far as I could see doesn't present any new information for the well read student.The first two chapters, which consume a surprising amount of the book, cover the prewar years starting with the Communist Revolution.The first chapter deals entirely within the country and the ordeals Stalin had in nuturing Communism and consolidating his power. It includes, among many other things, the five year plans to increase industrial and military output as well as food production through the collectivization of farms and the brutal methods Stalin took in achieving these goals. Stalin knew how susceptible his country was to invasion or overthrow and wanted to eliminate that scenario.The second chapter covers the few years before the war and includes more of the military aspects of Russia and her relations with Europe with added emphasis on France and England as they woo her to join an alliance with them against Germany. When it was discovered that Great Britain didn't have an army to resist Hitler, Stalin decided it was better to align himself with the powerful Germans and proceeded to form an alliance with Hitler. The author covers many of the key aspects in the prewar years that will lead to war; I've just mention couple of them. The coverage is sufficient and varied to give a basic understanding of Stalin, his country and the political environment between the key participants of the war.Though the book was very engaging and you could learn a lot from it, the coverage of the operational aspects of the war was very limited. There is a high level summary of the results and ramifications for the battles for Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and Operation Bagration and Berlin but don't buy this book for comprehensive tactical coverage of the ground war. if that is your main interest you'll be disappointed. For a good all around understanding of the war, buy this book which will cover the political, including profiling Stalin, and the human interest aspects plus David Glantz's book, "When Titans Clashed", for the military summary. Between these two books, a reader will have a good foundation, a good beginning of understanding the war on the eastern front.It becomes apparent after reading the book that Mr Overy has gained an admiration for Russia and its people. There is much to admire about their fortitude and ingenuity of overcoming the hardships of the first six month of war to defeat the powerful Wehrmacht but I believe the author has lost some of his objectivity while researching and writing his book. He praises Stalin too much and while mentioning his cruel deeds you can tell by his wording that he overlooks them. He claims Stalin was a good commander which is questionable. In some ways he had forsight by instituting a mobilization program, reserve armies, an aggressive tank training program and moving industry to the east out of harm's way. He also converted the country to a total war status quickly which was necessary but his command decisions were too aggressive and missions unrealistic for the condition of his armies that first year. He also ignored the warning signs that invasion was coming despite his itelligence network and his generals warnings. His defense preparations before the invasion were untimely and inadequate. The author also devalues the impact the military purges of the late 30s had on the war effort. He also ignores the British participation in North Africa which pulled Rommel and the DAK away from participating on the eastern front.It took Zhukov to save Leningrad and Moscow in those early days and Stalingrad the next year. Stalin wanted to start Uranus too soon, before his armies were ready. He wanted to go on the offensive at Kursk before Citadel started. Zhukov stopped Stalin from making these huge errors. Both events would have ended in disaster for Stalin if he had his way. It also took commanders like Konev, Rokossovsky, Chuikov and others who made the smart military decisions. Overy also discounts the fact that Russia had three times the Army as Germany, more and better tanks, more planes, guns, oil and had the advantage of knowing the battlefield better. He also discounts the billions in aid Stalin received from his allies. He also doesn't give much significance to Hitler's errors or the wrangling in the German command structure.There are also several little quibbles to mention about the numbers mention. The numbers quoted for Russian casualties and prisoners at Kiev are low by 25 pct. The numbers of tanks, especially Russian tanks deployed at Kursk are low and his numbers of tanks destroyed there are a little vague. The number of Germans who escaped from the Korsun Pocket are also low. His coverage of the Warsaw Uprising also favor the Russian interpertation of the event. These and a few other things make me believe the author's objectivity had slipped with this book.There are 32 photos; some were very good. For me, the photo of a young Stalin in 1924 was worth the price of the book. There are also 11 general purpose maps and three tables. There is also a scholarly Notes section and an impressive Bibliography of secondary sources. The book closes with an Index.There are many events that are covered in the book that due to space limitations could not be discussed in this review. The overall quality of the book is good and if you're looking for a concise summary that covers the political machinations, human tragedies of the war and a few years past the war with a brief coverage of the military and all from a Russian perspective then this book should be seriously considered.

If you are primarily looking for battlefield action look elsewhere. If you want insight into Soviet characters at the top and various military and political situations then this book is for you, even if first published as long ago as 1997 (i.e. 25 years ago as of this review). A short, sharp and concise treatment of Russia's (big part in the) war from start to finish and many of the behind the scenes power plays. Ideally one should read this book first to make sense of the Russian 'stance / mindset' before delving into other books that focus on particular battles throughout the war. However, even if you have read other books on the Eastern Front and the fall of Berlin, this book still contains some 'enlightening' background information. It also contains uncomfortable facts oft left unsaid in other works. An excellent book in my opinion, unless of course one finds the truth hard to stomach. The book is worth the buying simply for the last chapter (10) and the epilogue alone, i.e. The Cult of Personality: Stalin and the Legacy of War: and the epilogue; Russia's War: Myth and Reality.

We may have thought we had a bad time of it but almost unimaginable what happened in Russia even the fact that Stalin murdered so many of his own people wow that takes some getting your head round,a really good book a must read

A very well researched account of the war on the eastern front from the Soviet perspective. The descriptions of Stalin and the Soviet regime were fascinating albeit disturbing. The account of Stalin's last days were particularly nteresting. Overall an excellent read.

Well written,well researched and a great read. Everything you’d expect from Richard Overy.

Good book