Bomber Command (Zenith Military Classics)

This book by prolific and lauded British writer Max Hastings argues -- successfully, I believe -- that there was no consensus among British leaders in World War Two about what strategy to pursue in the aerial bombing of Germany. Throughout the war, different strategies were proposed at different times by different people, based on various theories of what makes aerial bombing effective, which metrics to use for evaluating its efficacy, and how best to employ the weapons in Bomber Command's hands. Some advocated precision bombing; others area bombing. Different methods of area bombing were advocated, some targeting buildings, others people. Of course, if you target buildings, and those buildings are people's houses, then you also target the people who live in those buildings, especially if you're bombing at night while they are asleep.Amidst this lack of consensus, a de facto strategy of civilian terror-bombing prevailed, in which the targets were whole cities, chosen primarily for their susceptibility to night area-bombing, employing fire and high explosives, by setting huge swathes of a city on fire and creating massive fire storms. This strategy was due largely to the autocratic leadership of Air Marshal Arthur Harris (a.k.a. "Bomber" Harris in the British press, "Butcher" or "Butch" Harris in the RAF), who was the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Bomber Command from 1942-45. Harris developed his own particular method of civilian terror-bombing, which involved targeting easy-to-locate cities containing built-up areas of densely packed buildings made of wood, using pathfinders, master bombers, and electronic navigational aids like H2S and Oboe, and dropping bombs containing a unique mix of high explosive and incendiary devices of various sizes. Harris measured efficacy using visual analysis of aerial reconnaissance photos to count the damage done to buildings. He claimed, quite falsely, that this was more effective at defeating Nazi Germany than the entire Soviet war effort. He clung to this strategy long after the USAAF began targeting oil production, sometimes to the point of disobeying orders, although he was never sacked from his command, either. This was the British "de-housing" strategy, advocated at various times by scientists, civil servants, RAF officers, politicians, and for the entire war by Harris.What this book does not explicitly discuss, but nonetheless is implicit at every step, is the rhetoric of semantics, in which the "intended" target is not civilians, but nonetheless the method employed is designed to be as effective as possible at killing city residents. The de facto result is the terror-bombing of civilians, but with plausible (or implausible) deniability, as the "intention" is merely to destroy buildings. This is usually presented along with the justification that they started the war, they did it to us first, this is the way war works, civilians are just regrettable collateral damage, etc.Author Max Hasting's chapter about the RAF's Darmstadt raid on the night of 11-12 September, 1944, demonstrates how irrelevant such justifications are. Whatever else you call it, this is still war waged against civilians, killing as many as possible. It culminated in the infamous attack on Dresden in the final weeks of the war, which caused many in Britain to question the morality of such raids, and which seemed to have little relation to hastening the end of the war. In the end, Winston Churchill criticized and distanced himself from Bomber Command, while no campaign medal was awarded to them by Parliament, and Harris was rejected as a candidate for leading the post-war RAF, instead moving to Rhodesia to command their small air force in the fight to retain white minority rule in southern Africa.In the decades since the war, some historians, leaders, veterans and pundits have denied there ever was any strategy by the RAF to terror-bomb civilians -- a claim which the author successfully refutes -- while others have defended Air Marshal Harris. Readers who share these opinions would do well to read this book, as it lays out the opportunity costs of terror-bombing, which preempted other successful strategies like targeting energy, industry, transportation, communications, and reserves, which demonstrably did help cripple Germany's war-making ability. It is tragic insofar as this detracts from the heroism of Bomber Command personnel, whose crews suffered an average mortality rate of 44.4%, higher than that of British infantry officers on the Western Front in World War One. Author Max Hastings provides good detail of their perspective on the war, as the people tasked to carry out Harris' strategy. Often it is the tragedy of war that the ultimate sacrifice is expected of those who must carry out the most odious ends.I recommend this book to anyone interested in the war in the air during World War Two, or in the history of aerial warfare. It is a case study in the moral ambiguity and lack of consensus that attends aerial warfare against civilian populations, whether they are the primary targets or merely "collateral damage."

I knew that Americans bombed Nazi-controlled Europe by day and Britain bombed Nazi-controlled Europe by night. I knew Britain used radio signals to enable accurate nighttime bombing. But I knew little more than that about the British bombing campaign. And even what I thought I knew wasn’t necessarily accurate. So this book provided lots of additional information and perspective. For example:[1] After Dunkirk, there were no British land forces in Europe, so bombers were Britain’s only way to take offensive actions against targets within Nazi-controlled Europe and especially within Germany itself. But in the early days of the war, Britain quickly learned that bombers could not attack during the day without suffering massive losses from German’s fighters. Bombing at night had its share of risks, but was clearly nowhere as suicidal as daylight bombing.[2] Many know that, by 1944, massive British nighttime bombing raids were beginning to devastate Germany’s cities. But in the earlier years (especially, 1939-1941), Britain’s nighttime bombing raids were minimally effective as radio/radar guided bombing was not yet developed, allowing German’s routine blackout practices to be a simple but effective means to frustrate Britain’s nighttime attempts to try and target Germany’s cities and factories.This book is completely focused on Britain’s Bomber Command and consequently provided more information, historical perspective, personal experiences, tactics and strategy on that subject than any other book I’ve read.Unfortunately, pervading the whole book is the author’s opinion that Britain’s bombing campaign was mostly ineffective and so drained human and material resources away from other wartime priorities where they could have had a more meaningful impact (e.g., against the U-boats). The book had a fair number of quotes (certainly more than I wanted to see) – and those quotes tended to buttress the author’s opinion. Of course, if you get to pick which quotes to use, your arguments will always appear sound.Bottom line: Excellent description of the constantly evolving nighttime air war over Germany. But the author’s claims of Bomber Command ineffectiveness suffered by only presenting one side of a debate.

Book arrived in great condition. Was even wrapped in bubble wrap by the vendor. First time I've seen that. Spine is tight to the point I'm pretty sure the book has never been read cover to cover. Anyway, great service, everything arrived as described and even 3 days early.

Max Hastings is a good author, I have read a number of his other books and his straight talking impartial always came through.Not so in this book. Yes its a good read and I will probably read it again, but he obviously has an issue with Harris.Numerous comments throughout show his bias and he talks from hindsight. He ignored that Harris couldn't have made his decisions in isolation and the allied leadership supported the bombing (otherwise they would have stopped him earlier).Hastings mostly ignores that Germany had indiscriminately bombed it's way across Europe, bombing civilians at will and machine gunning refugees. Major civilian parts of the UK had been repeatedly bombed and the Government and the public wanted the German public to get a taste of what their air force had dished out.In future just tell people what happened and keep your personal comments to yourself - your readers can make their own minds up on right and wrong

Whilst the detailed research, blending of personal, squadron and senior command experience is first class, there is an agenda here. Hastings doesn't like Harris, and everything else seems like a case for the prosecution. Hastings has the advantage of hindsight and an in depth knowledge of what was going on inside the Reich. He seems to think that Harris and every senior British commander should have known the same. He also seems incapable of seeing events through 1940s eyes.He would be best to present in a more balanced format, and let readers make their own decisions. But that wouldn't sell books half as well as a controversial character assassination.

I always have mixed feelings when an author writes about his own country and its exploitsThis book is very different - Max Hastings takes a largely high-level view of a complex and emotional topic and analyses it in great detailHe does this in a style that is extremely readable, without fluff or going off-trackThis book should be "mandatory" reading for anyone of school going age and above, in the UK (and elsewhere)Highly recommended!

This is an excellent examination of what is still a contentious subject: the bombing campaign against Germany. The author provides a masterly survey of this key part of the air war, including areas that are nearly always overlooked: for example, the early phase that lasted from the start of the war, through the Battle of Britain, until the "heavies" (most notably the Lancaster) came into service. Most potential readers of this book will be aware of the huge loss rate among Bomber Command crews, but I expect many won't be aware of the even greater sacrifices made in the early years, with crews having to cope with inadequate aircraft and a formidable enemy. I certainly was not.The author also brings valuable insight into questions about the later, and better known, parts of the campaign, deftly painting a gripping picture of both grand strategy and (just as importantly) the minutiae of what was involved. Whatever conclusions may be drawn about the morality and value of the campaign now, from the safety of of a time of peace, the courage of the bomber crews demands admiration and respect.Even if you've read many books on the subject already, this should be in your collection.

Superb account of a most challenging subject full of moral as well as shifting military dilemmas. Hastings, as always, addresses topics from multiple perspectives to allow you to make your own judgement. Of course he doesn't avoid presenting his conclusions but you feel you are given the information to disagree with him.The entire book, from start to finish, is compelling, but one chapter deserves highlighting. His detailed description of the bombing of Darmstadt on 9/11 1944 is stunning and somewhat chilling noting subsequent events 50+ years later. Some 12,000 people, mostly civilians including many children, were killed that night.In addition though to describing the horror of the bombing on both the bombing crew and the "bombed" Hastings also looked at the operational costs and introduced, to me, the notion that the deployment of bombers had both strategic and tactical failings. For example the continued area bombing of cities came at huge expense while the potential of sustained bombing of oil facilities, which would have had more impact, was not exploited.Hasting's assessment, towards the end of the book, that "Bomber Command was very well served by its aircrew, and with a very few exceptions very badly served by its senior officers, in the Second World War" is hard to argue with.