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Writing in an accessible yet thought-provoking style, David Chalmers takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that trenchantly illustrate his ideas, as well as thoughtful discussions of how his theories might be practically applied to subjects as diverse as artificial intelligence intelligence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Review: Conscious Mind Searches for Its Transcendent Origin - In The Journal of Consciousness Studies, David Chalmers wrote: “ Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted.” The mystery of consciousness revolves around the question: “How can living physical bodies in the physical world acquire such phenomena?” Chalmers favors the non-reductionist, non-physical approach which may ultimately provide pivotal concepts needed to resolve the question. In The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, David Chalmers introduces the notion of the hard problem of consciousness. According to Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness is explaining how we experience it with respect to: (1) sensory inputs and the mysterious modes of their neural processing and (2) qualia - phenomena where the processing is accompanied by ineffably subjective aspects of conscious experience which apprehend the redness of red, the beauty of mathematical forms, love, the selfness experience. These have a relationship with physical brain-states, but are not identical to brain states because they are transcendent - essentially objectively unmeasurable - states of consciousness. Chalmers observes that subjective information processing invariably accompanies sensory and neural signal processing. We do not just retain visual sensations; we judge the quality of colors, the contrast of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field with meaningful images that are conjured up mentally, that are felt emotionally, and inspire experiential conscious thought. What unites these states of consciousness somehow transcends the physical sensory experiences. Empirical science and neuroscience have attempted to explain the nature of conscious experience. But to fully account for conscious experience, Chalmers suggests that we need an extra ingredient to explain and elucidate the hard problem of consciousness. That extra ingredient should explain how accumulated experiences, arising in and retained by the brain, are elaborated, interpreted, and qualified by our consciousness. Roger Penrose and Staurt Hameroff (Toward a Science of Consciousness), suggest that human cognition may depend on quantum wavefunction collapses in microtubules, the cytoskeletons of a neuron. Penrose and Hameroff suspect that wavefunction collapse in microtubules may be the physical basis of conscious experience. In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers writes that although “these ideas are extremely speculative . . . they could at least conceivably help to explain certain elements of human cognitive functioning.” Our embodiment is primarily a survival machine with no inherent consciousness, a Chalmerian zombie. In The Conscious Mind David Chalmers describes an isomorph, “A zombie [that] is just something physically identical to me but which has no conscious experience ‒ all is dark inside.” In any case, survival machines are programmed to respond to and survive their environments, to replicate and evolve, without any urgent need to assume human consciousness or engage in social intercourse. Chalmers argues for the transcendent nature of consciousness; insisting that “consciousness is simply not to be characterized as a functional property” and that, “No explanation given wholly in physical terms can ever account for the emergence of conscious experience.” In My Universe - A Transcendent Reality, author Alex Vary proposes a conceptual framework to help elucidate the transcendent nature of consciousness and its relation to the physical world. The proposed framework is based on deductions and information revealed primarily by distinct quantum phenomena which are demonstrably transcendent. An essential feature of the framework is the mesostratum; a signal transmission modality. The mesostratum machinery that Vary imagines offers an explanatory gap-filling linkage from a transcendent continuum to a physical neural discontinuum. Vary suggests ways to access the mesostratum, to explore it, to explain the nature of human consciousness; and cites examples of access to the mesostratum. Chalmers essentially intuits that non-physical agencies (perhaps mesostratum agencies) participated in the appearance and evolution of human consciousness. If mesostratum agencies modulate human consciousness then at least select humans should be able to reciprocally access, explore, and exploit resources of the mesostratum. Anecdotal examples are legion: prodigious savants, geniuses, virtuosos, such as Mozart, Goethe, John von Neuman. Review: A very good book. I work in the field of consciousness ... - A very good book. I work in the field of consciousness research, so I guess I'm biased with a lot of background knowledge, but I'd say, for experts this book is excellent. Chalmers approaches this problem like a mathematician. He doesn't cling to intuitions or cherished beliefs, he simply constructs arguments with cold-hearted rational thinking. His main point can actually be summarized quite simply: we, as a matter of fact, cannot deduce experiences from functional interactions. We can deduce output, and other functions, but not experiences. This then suggests a simple implication: experiences, unlike normal material entities, are not encompassed fully by functions (although they clearly correlate with it). I'd say you really appreciate this as someone working in the field (more maybe than if you don't), because the problems he predicts are exactly the problems that arise. Every theory of consciousness at some points hits a brick wall. Global Workspace: highlighted information is conscious; IIT: integrated information is conscious; recurrently processed information is conscious; attended or memorized information is conscious; information generating meta information is conscious; neuronal interactions at 40Hz generate consciousness, and so on. The problem with every theory, in the end, is that the starting point seems arbitrary and not rationally explainable. Why should 40Hz oscillations lead to experiences, but 39 Hz not? Why can information not simply be integrated unconsciously? What's so special about memory that it requires consciousness (as opposed to calculating root squares for instance)? These problems that we run into in the practice of consciousness research highlight Chalmers's points: there is, in our understanding, an unbridgeable gap between functions and experiences. This makes the problem of consciousness considerably more intractable then nearly all other scientific problems.
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A**Y
Conscious Mind Searches for Its Transcendent Origin
In The Journal of Consciousness Studies, David Chalmers wrote: “ Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted.” The mystery of consciousness revolves around the question: “How can living physical bodies in the physical world acquire such phenomena?” Chalmers favors the non-reductionist, non-physical approach which may ultimately provide pivotal concepts needed to resolve the question. In The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, David Chalmers introduces the notion of the hard problem of consciousness. According to Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness is explaining how we experience it with respect to: (1) sensory inputs and the mysterious modes of their neural processing and (2) qualia - phenomena where the processing is accompanied by ineffably subjective aspects of conscious experience which apprehend the redness of red, the beauty of mathematical forms, love, the selfness experience. These have a relationship with physical brain-states, but are not identical to brain states because they are transcendent - essentially objectively unmeasurable - states of consciousness. Chalmers observes that subjective information processing invariably accompanies sensory and neural signal processing. We do not just retain visual sensations; we judge the quality of colors, the contrast of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field with meaningful images that are conjured up mentally, that are felt emotionally, and inspire experiential conscious thought. What unites these states of consciousness somehow transcends the physical sensory experiences. Empirical science and neuroscience have attempted to explain the nature of conscious experience. But to fully account for conscious experience, Chalmers suggests that we need an extra ingredient to explain and elucidate the hard problem of consciousness. That extra ingredient should explain how accumulated experiences, arising in and retained by the brain, are elaborated, interpreted, and qualified by our consciousness. Roger Penrose and Staurt Hameroff (Toward a Science of Consciousness), suggest that human cognition may depend on quantum wavefunction collapses in microtubules, the cytoskeletons of a neuron. Penrose and Hameroff suspect that wavefunction collapse in microtubules may be the physical basis of conscious experience. In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers writes that although “these ideas are extremely speculative . . . they could at least conceivably help to explain certain elements of human cognitive functioning.” Our embodiment is primarily a survival machine with no inherent consciousness, a Chalmerian zombie. In The Conscious Mind David Chalmers describes an isomorph, “A zombie [that] is just something physically identical to me but which has no conscious experience ‒ all is dark inside.” In any case, survival machines are programmed to respond to and survive their environments, to replicate and evolve, without any urgent need to assume human consciousness or engage in social intercourse. Chalmers argues for the transcendent nature of consciousness; insisting that “consciousness is simply not to be characterized as a functional property” and that, “No explanation given wholly in physical terms can ever account for the emergence of conscious experience.” In My Universe - A Transcendent Reality, author Alex Vary proposes a conceptual framework to help elucidate the transcendent nature of consciousness and its relation to the physical world. The proposed framework is based on deductions and information revealed primarily by distinct quantum phenomena which are demonstrably transcendent. An essential feature of the framework is the mesostratum; a signal transmission modality. The mesostratum machinery that Vary imagines offers an explanatory gap-filling linkage from a transcendent continuum to a physical neural discontinuum. Vary suggests ways to access the mesostratum, to explore it, to explain the nature of human consciousness; and cites examples of access to the mesostratum. Chalmers essentially intuits that non-physical agencies (perhaps mesostratum agencies) participated in the appearance and evolution of human consciousness. If mesostratum agencies modulate human consciousness then at least select humans should be able to reciprocally access, explore, and exploit resources of the mesostratum. Anecdotal examples are legion: prodigious savants, geniuses, virtuosos, such as Mozart, Goethe, John von Neuman.
Y**O
A very good book. I work in the field of consciousness ...
A very good book. I work in the field of consciousness research, so I guess I'm biased with a lot of background knowledge, but I'd say, for experts this book is excellent. Chalmers approaches this problem like a mathematician. He doesn't cling to intuitions or cherished beliefs, he simply constructs arguments with cold-hearted rational thinking. His main point can actually be summarized quite simply: we, as a matter of fact, cannot deduce experiences from functional interactions. We can deduce output, and other functions, but not experiences. This then suggests a simple implication: experiences, unlike normal material entities, are not encompassed fully by functions (although they clearly correlate with it). I'd say you really appreciate this as someone working in the field (more maybe than if you don't), because the problems he predicts are exactly the problems that arise. Every theory of consciousness at some points hits a brick wall. Global Workspace: highlighted information is conscious; IIT: integrated information is conscious; recurrently processed information is conscious; attended or memorized information is conscious; information generating meta information is conscious; neuronal interactions at 40Hz generate consciousness, and so on. The problem with every theory, in the end, is that the starting point seems arbitrary and not rationally explainable. Why should 40Hz oscillations lead to experiences, but 39 Hz not? Why can information not simply be integrated unconsciously? What's so special about memory that it requires consciousness (as opposed to calculating root squares for instance)? These problems that we run into in the practice of consciousness research highlight Chalmers's points: there is, in our understanding, an unbridgeable gap between functions and experiences. This makes the problem of consciousness considerably more intractable then nearly all other scientific problems.
M**T
Well written and argued but ultimately unsatisfying as an explanation of consciousness
I admit up front I'm a Chalmers fan and that is not to say that I agree with his many of his speculations concerning properties of the universe yielding consciousness. I like the way Chalmers angles at a subject and explores objections to his view at every step of the process. He does incorporate certain assumptions he fails to explore however and they turn out to be significant. This is Chalmers' first book (1997) on consciousness, a subject he reprises in 2010 with "The Character of Consciousness" a book I reviewed some time back. In some ways, this book is a clearer exposition than the reprise. The subject matter is more clearly divided. In the first part of the book he argues that materialism must be false because consciousness does not logically supervene on physical process though it does "naturally supervene" on them. His arguments here are carefully crafted and reasonably convincing. He pays careful attention to distinguishing consciousness (the "what it is like to be" nature of subjective experience) from psychological or cognitive states. He is a little to quick here to define this line so sharply but he uses this clean distinction to get a handle on why it is so difficult to connect brain states directly to the subjective experience of consciousness. This line of argument leads Chalmers to a "property dualism" in which a new phenomenon, consciousness that is real but not physical nevertheless emerges from the physical, that is the causally closed physics of modern science. He uses the second half of his book, less persuasively, to propose a speculative solution. So how does this all go? Chalmers posits a set of psychophysical or phenomenal laws in parallel with physical laws. These other laws are not merely aspects of physical law which physicists have not yet discovered (along lines of Thomas Nagel's "anomalous monism"). Rather they are a complete set of laws, independent of the physical that happen to exist in parallel with it. They are undetectable by physics and moreover they really do not have any effect on the evolution of the universe until the right kind of organization happens to come along (something that might not have happened)at which time they serve to connect up with the physical organization to evoke the new phenomenon of mind. Chalmers glibly assumes that the laws of physics and the psychophysical are eternal. This assumption is problematic for various reasons not central to his theme here, but it does impinge on it. If the physical universe had a beginning, what sense can be made of laws existing eternally prior to there being anything for them to govern or describe? Where does eternality come from? Moreover, an "eternal laws" would imply that all the particulars of relations between particles, radiation, and fields of the physical universe (including the various arbitrary constants that, being what they are, allow for the development of galaxies, stars, planets, and even life) were not just accidents that could have settled into other values but rather had to come out as they did. This is the important part. If only the physical laws had any effect on cosmological evolution up to the appearance of certain organizations then it is quite possible that those types of organizations might never have appeared (they are accidents of contingency). If that had been the history of our universe, then the psychophysical would have been entirely redundant. On the other hand, if the non-material laws had some influence on physical evolution, then that influence ought to be measurable, at least in principle. There is no evidence of such an effect in physics of course and Chalmers doesn't really care whether life and subsequent consciousness are pure accidents or were in some manner directed. It is the hypothesized connection between the physical and the psychophysical that gives him the "natural supervenience" of the mental on the physical his theory requires. Perhaps an example of my own would make this clearer. Imagine physical law (eternal or otherwise)governs how hydrogen and oxygen interact to form water and produce its special properties. Now imagine that there is, in parallel with physical law, another law (call it XYZ) that is not physical and cannot be detected by any measurement. XYZ is entirely redundant to normal physics and the evolution of physical systems. But whenever liquid water is brought to a temperature of 300F, XYZ turns the water into a purple goo. Now normally there is no liquid water at 300F and so the XYZ law never has any effect on anything but it nevertheless exists along with the more conventional laws of physics that govern the properties of water. At some point in the evolution of the universe there come to be creatures who learn to put water under pressure and do bring its liquid state to a temperature of 300F. To everyone's surprise, the water turns into purple goo but it remains the case that as before XYZ remains strictly undetectable by physics. What Chalmers would say here is that purple goo does not "logically supervene" on the ordinary laws of physics because we can imagine liquid water at 300F without it becoming purple goo. But purple goo does "naturally supervene" on the laws of physics because XYZ always and automatically connects up water and purple goo whenever the physical conditions are made right. My analogy goes only so far as purple goo is presumably a physical stuff while consciousness is not. Of course there is no non-physical XYZ that turns water into a purple goo. But Chalmers claims exactly this for the phenomenon of consciousness which is non-material (something for which he argues persuasively) and therefore demands a postulate of psychophysical laws which connect up with the physical under appropriate conditions resulting in a non-physical phenomenon. We can imagine all sorts of complex brain states and functional organizations existing, even having psychological and behavioral effects measureable by third parties, without there being any consciousness, that is any experience of what it is like to be a subject. But because psychophysical laws also exist (undetectable by physics), when and if sufficient functional organization comes along (whether in biology, computers, or even societies of persons) the psychophysical laws will be entangled (or activated or envoked) by the functional organization and map the physical organization into a subjective experience. This is a proper "property dualism" for which Chalmers argues. It is a dualism because there is truly something different, that is not material, that emerges in the universe, and it is a "property dualism" because its dualistic (non-material) properties come not from some special antecedent source (for example God as in substance dualism) but from material physics albeit conjoined with psychophysical laws which are (a) non-physical, (b) eternal like the physical laws, and (c) the connecting link between the physical and the subjective-mental. The well known dilemma of substance dualism is the "interaction problem" which challenges the doctrine on the grounds that there is no mechanism by which the physical can interact with the non-material mind stuff. For all his careful work in this book, Chalmers never appreciates the irony that his psychophysical laws must suffer from the very same interaction problem. He offers no mechanism by which this interaction takes place, that is, how it is that certain functional organizations of physical stuff become entangled with the non-physical psychophysical laws. In the end, therefore, while this book is a good example of philosophical exposition, it ends up being very unsatisfying as an explanation for consciousness.
L**E
Bewildering Intellect
This book is, out simply enough, the most comprehensive challenge to materialism and non dualism of mind I have ever come across. Chalmers is adept in his arguments, and skilled at explaining obscure metaphysical principles in a way that most will able to apprehend. He even goes to the trouble of labeling those chapters which are philosophically technical as such; so, if you're a layman, fret not; you will be able to read this book. Definitely a must read!
D**N
duality well defended
There is a learning curve to the material discussed, but overall, it is well defended. The author should consider writing a smaller introductory book as a means to ease the entrance barrier. ( Note : I personally had to go this route before reading this book )
H**S
Interesting Ideas Couched in Impenetrable Verbiage
Chalmers deserves much credit for his stress on strong vs weak emergence of consciousness, and on psychological vs. phenomenological concepts of consciousness. His critique of materialism is also very powerful, IMHO. There are two major problems with this book, however. The first is that it is far too closely argued for the general public. He tells the reader what sections can be skipped, but it is still incredibly verbose and abstruse. He should write a popular version. The second problem is that he takes science very seriously (his discussions of neuroscience and quantum mechanics are quite insightful---I love his suggestion that consciousness and quantum mechanics may be linked only because both are mysteries), but he consistently confuses limitations on our scientific understanding of the physical principles of our Universe with categorical distinctions. Most important is his contention that phenomenal consciousness (PC) is natural but not physical, on which his property dualism is founded. I can see no reason for denying the physicality of PC. Of course PC lies completely outside of natural science as we know it, but lots of things lie outside of natural science as we know it, and there are deep problems in critical areas of theoretical physics. Basically, all modern physics can deal with involve observations involving electromagnetic and gravitational forces. Even the strong and weak nuclear forces are revealed only through electromagnetic interactions. Indeed, gravitational arguments show that about 5/6 of the matter in the Universe is "dark matter" that does not interact with photons at all, and neutrinos, which are a good part of the remaining mass, interacts incredibly weakly. We simply do not know all the forces of nature, and this is reason enough to believe that PC may be a form of physical reality that we simply do not understand. I think there is simply no grounds for dualism at all, and Chalmers' argument is clearly specious. Chalmers also goes to far in bowing to materialism when talking about everything but PC. He repeated asserts the brain is "physically closed," and PC can have no physical effects---the classic stance of epiphenomenalism. He says the explanation of human behave would not change if we were zombies without consciousness, so PC is extra-physical. This strikes me a preposterous. I understand his position for some mental phenomena, such as pain---we could enjoy all the aversive benefits of pain without actually feeling pain. But could Chalmers write his book were he an unconscious zombie? This seems implausible. But writing his book is a physical act. Therefore his PC entails physical forces applied in a manner that even Newton would have understood. He might reply that psychological, not phenomenological, consciousness is involved in writing the book, but this is an empty, and prima facie implausible, claim. PC would not have evolved if it did not have real effects on the survival of individuals possessing it. Some readers have complained that Chalmers does not discuss free will. I think this is to his credit. The classic debate of free will vs. determinism is infected with the ideology of materialism/anti-materialism, which says that our mental life is/is not the product of chemical reactions in the brain, If consciousness is a physical phenomenon, it may or may not obey the sorts of equations we know and love from quantum mechanics and relativity theory. We simply don't know.
J**F
Dualism is a Viable Theory
When an argument pulls me kicking and screaming from a doctrinaire mindset, it deserves five stars! Chalmers argues carefully and meticulously for a dualist theory of consciousness, abandoning the materialist assumptions of most academicians. While it was difficult to imagine a non-materialistic, physical account of natural dualism, I now realize the strength and importance of such a theory in all discussions of mind and science in general. It’s a complex read for non-academics, but well worth the time.
S**M
Too Narrow a Framework
Whenever I pick up a book about consciousness I always check the index. If the book doesn't even mention Carlos Castaneda's work, I know there will be nothing there of interest to me. Let me say at the outset that if anyone wants to read a truly revelatory work on consciousness begin with Castaneda's series on his apprenticeship with a masterly brujo named Don Juan. The problem here is that this book is completely rationality-based in a closed egocentric system, which doesn't even refer to consciousness as conceived in other cultures or throughout history. It is pure scientific reductionism, as in: scientific man is the center of the universe and the measure of all things. Not even Kant's dictum is cited in this book: "Space and time are the framework within which the mind is constrained to construct its experience of reality." In other words what our senses experience as interpreted by the mind is the closest we can get as rational beings to "reality." What we call `reality' is only a construct, an interpretation or a description. We agree on it by-and-large because we created it. As Blavatsky pointed out: "The Mind is the great Slayer of the Real." So if anyone is going to opine on consciousness and publish their ramblings, at least look for ideas outside academia and beyond western rationalist dogmas.
L**S
Uma busca de definição científica de consciência e mente
Ainda não acabei de ler. Mas gostei, até agora, da forma de apresentação do tema principal do livro. Está escrito em um inglês muito correto.
M**A
Un saggio provocatorio su un argomento affascinante
Ho deciso di leggere "The conscious mind" di David Chalmers, dopo aver scoperto che il suo punto di vista sulla natura della coscienza umana è molto simile alle mie idee sull'argomento. Noi tutti, ogni giorno, abbiamo l'esperienza di accorgersi di esistere, siamo coscienti. Ma che cos'è la coscienza? Per le neuroscienze la coscienza è un fenomeno correlato all'attività neurologica di determinate aree del cervello. E' assente nella fase di sonno senza sogni, nel coma o sotto l'effetto di anestetici. Le neuroscienze non studiano direttamente la coscienza, bensì hanno come obbiettivo la scoperta dei "correlati neurologici della coscienza", in pratica quali aree del cervello sono attive quando la coscienza è presente e cosa cambia quando la coscienza è assente. In questi studi, la coscienza viene definita come stato vigile, e normalmente è basata sulle dichiarazioni dei pazienti/volontari. Nonostante che in molti articoli scientifici viene dichiarato che la coscienza è un fenomeno biologico che non richiede nessuna nuova legge fisica per essere spiegata, nessuno, finora, è mai riuscito a spiegare in modo soddisfacente come un fenomeno fisico-chimico, ormai ben conosciuto, come l'attività neuronale possa creare la coscienza. Chalmers evidenzia questo fatto per tutto il suo saggio e sostiene che la coscienza, pur essendo correlata all'attività del cervello, non possa essere spiegata in termini fisico-chimici. Si tratta di un libro molto impegnativo, non certo di facile lettura. Non è un testo divulgativo. Tuttavia, secondo il mio punto di vista, Chalmers avrebbe potuto esporre gli stessi concetti in modo più sintetico: spesso ho trovato molte ripetizioni degli stessi argomenti in capitoli diversi, appesantendo inutilmente il saggio.
K**T
Essential reading for studying consciousness
Whilst there are a few important (though not super major) issues I disagree with Chalmers' take on in this book, this book is essential reading for studying consciousness and understanding the hard problem and some ideas on how to begin to solve it
P**L
Not the expected condition
The delivery was very fast, but I ordered the book in new condition and received it with almost all corners damaged which is probably thanks to it being poorly packaged. Thankfully this doesn't change the content, but I would've liked to have this particular book in perfect condition hence the 3 star rating.
R**O
An excellent (but a little difficult to read) book to get into hard problem of consciousness.
Consciousness is still not completely understood, and many of the great minds in the history have tried to search for a theory to completely explain it but it remains difficult to achieve, up to now. David J. Chalmers makes a remarkable try in this book that is worth to read it. Chalmers recognize that the problem of consciousness lies uneasily at the border of science and philosophy, and is extraordinary difficult, if not impossible, to study using the scientific methods. This is a key fact that permeates the rest of the book. Chalmers recognize that the problem of consciousness may be a scientific problem but uses philosophical methods to understand it. For me, neither of both is completely true, and can not be asserted. As matter of fact, no one really knows if consciousness is something to be studied using scientific methods or philosophical methods, or even, some still-unknown method. The first chapters (1-4) use philosophical methods to explain Consciousness, explaining “supervenience” as key concept to define the relationship of mental states with the physical states. It was extraordinary difficult for me to read it and follow it (I'm not a philosopher), so I just skim through most of it (as suggested by Chalmers). A large part of this section is devoted to defining what is consciousness, the conscious experience, the cognitive process, functionalism, physical vs psychical states, and so on. But no final definition of consciousness is fully achieved. Also, the mind-body argument is strongly argued against many of the arguments of other authors (Rosenthal, Dennett among others). Then Chalmers analyze the consciousness problem using a cognitive psychology model and process approach but without really going anywhere. Then interestingly Chalmers switches to quantum mechanics theory as a possible explanation of consciousness being the “observer” entity required for quantum mechanics to work. Then later Chalmers discuss the Information Theory, as another alternative explanation of consciousness which inadvertently bring us to a “panpsychism” realm. This book at heart is really about an epistemic problem. For me this is an important corollary. As Chalmers himself admits: “Given the actual epistemological assumptions. We need to find a new paradigm”. I completely agree with this statement. Chalmers proposes a final theory, as a set of psychophysical laws analogous to fundamental laws in physics, but do not go into the details or the foundations of it. At the end Chalmers seems to agree with the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics: “the Everett interpretation seems in many ways the most attractive, but at the same time it is the hardest to accept.”. There is a lot to say about this book, but it is not my purpose and I'm not able to do a comprehensive review. This book is very technical, I'm not a philosopher, but although it takes me more time than usual to read it, it was worthwhile. I really like to read and know about the consciousness problem, and this book give me valuable answers: Consciousness is out of the scope of science method and philosophy, and we need a new epistemic approach; This book is an evocative journey to understand consciousness from quite different views, perspectives, models, methods, and though not conclusive, it is worthwhile.
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